Database outsourcing is a popular industry trend which involves organizations delegating their data management needs to an external service provider. In this model, a service provider hosts its clients' databases and offers mechanisms for clients to create, store, update and access (query) their databases. Since a service provider is almost never fully trusted, security and privacy of outsourced data are important concerns.
Introduction
Database outsourcing is a prominent example of the more general commercial trend of outsourcing non-core competencies. In the Outsourced Database (ODB) Model, a third-party database service provider offers adequate software, hardware and network resources to host its clients' databases as well as mechanisms to efficiently create, update and access outsourced data.
The ODB model poses numerous research challenges which influence overall performance, usability and scalability. One of the biggest challenges is the security of hosted data. A client stores its data (which is usually a critical asset) at an external, and potentially untrusted, database service provider. It is thus important to secure outsourced data from potential attacks not only by malicious outsiders but also from the service provider itself.
The two pillars of data security are privacy and integrity. (We use the term integrity in a somewhat broad sense, encompassing both data integrity and authentication of origin.) The need for data privacy in the ODB model has been recognized and addressed, to some degree, in prior work by Hacigümüş, et al. [13] . The central problem in the context of privacy is allowing a client to efficiently query its own data hosted by a third-party service provider (referred to as simply "server" from here on) while revealing to the latter neither the actual query nor the data over which the query is executed.
1. Unified Client: a database is owned by a single client which is also the only entity querying the same database. This is the simplest ODB scenario with relatively few security challenges (in terms of integrity).
2. Multi-Querier: a database is owned by a single client but multiple queriers are allowed to query the hosted database. This scenario is very similar to authentic third-party publication [9] .
3. Multi-Owner: a database is jointly owned by multiple clients and multiple queriers are allowed to query the hosted database. This scenario is typical in many organizational settings where multiple users/entities are allowed to own a subset of records within the same database. (Consider, for example, a sales database where each salesperson owns all records for the transactions that she performed.)
Since the integrity issues in the Unified Client scenario are few and easily handled with standard textbook techniques, in the remainder of this paper, we focus on the Multi-Querier and Multi-Owner scenarios.
We assume that a querier may be a device (or an entity) limited in all or some of: computation, communication and storage facilities. A cellphone, a wireless PDA or a computer communicating over a slow dial-up line are all examples of such anemic queriers. Limited amount of battery power may be an additional, yet orthogonal, issue.
All of these constraints incentivize new techniques that optimize (i.e., minimize) both communication and computation overhead for the queriers in the ODB model. To this end, the recent work in [19] considered two signature schemes: Condensed-RSA and Aggregated-BGLS both of which allow the server to return to the querier a set of records 2 matching the query predicate along with a single aggregated signature. Condensed-RSA is very efficient but only permits aggregation of signatures produced by a single signer. In contrast, Aggregated-BGLS is less efficient but supports aggregation of signatures produced by multiple signers. Hence, Condensed-RSA is more suitable for the Multi-Querier, and Aggregated-BGLS -for the Multi-Owner, scenario.
Motivation
Although both techniques explored in [19] are fairly practical, each exhibits a potentially undesirable mutability feature. Mutability means that anyone in possession of multiple aggregated signatures can derive new and valid (authentic) aggregated signatures which may correspond to un-posed queries. For example, consider a database with two relations employee and department with the following respective schemas: employee(empID, name, salary, deptID) and department(deptID, managerID). We now suppose that two SQL queries: Q1 and Q2 (in Figure 1) A querier who posed SQL queries Q1 and Q2 and obtained the corresponding aggregated signatures S1 and S2, can compute, on her own, a valid new signature for the un-posed query Q3, also in Figure 1 . Q3, in essence, is (Q1 Q2) i.e., information about all managers who earn more than 100K and less than 140K. The specifics of computing a new signature from a set of existing signatures depend on the underlying aggregated signature scheme, as described in the next section. We note that the above example is not specific to the use of aggregated signature schemes for integrity purposes in the ODB context. In fact, without aggregated signatures, it suffices to obtain a single authentic query reply in order to construct other such replies. Suppose that, instead, plain record-level signatures were used (e.g., DSA or RSA). In this case, a single SELECT-style query would cause the server to construct a query reply containing a set of records (matching the query predicate), each accompanied by its signature. Clearly, it is then trivial for a querier to construct legitimate and authentic query replies for un-posed queries since she is free to manipulate individual record-level signatures. Furthermore, other more efficient methods, such as the elegant constructs based on Merkle Hash Trees (MHTs) suggested by Devanbu, et al. [9] , are equally susceptible to mutability of authentic query replies. 3 At this point, one might wonder about the dangers of mutability in aggregated signature schemes, i.e., whether it is really an undesirable feature. The answer is clearly application dependent; in some settings, it might indeed be desirable to derive, propagate and/or transfer authentic query replies. For example, if queriers are expected, over time, to be able to propagate or answer queries from other queriers (e.g., to reduce load on a busy server), mutability might be an attractive feature. However, in the present setting of outsourced databases, mutability may indeed be undesirable. Recall that, in both Multi-Querier and MultiOwner ODB scenarios, owner(s) outsource the database to an external server. The server handles all queries and provides each querier the result set matching a query along with an aggregated signature by the original data owner. In other words, the server is the authorized agent for re-distributing the information stored in, or derived from, the outsourced database.
It is safe to assume that Multi-Querier and Multi-Owner scenarios involve more queriers than data owners. Consequently, one reason for avoiding mutability is to prevent unauthorized splitting and re-distribution of authentic query replies. For example, consider the case of data owners and/or servers who wish to charge a fee for each query over the outsourced database. Consequently, it might be important to prevent queriers from deriving new valid aggregated signatures (new query reply sets are easy to derive) from prior query reply sets and re-selling information that has not been paid for. In this case, we would like the server to be the sole data distributor.
As noted in section 1, we stress that mutability can be a blessing in some application scenarios. For instance, if a server does not get paid on a per query basis, in order to reduce load, it might be beneficial to allow some queriers to themselves process queries from other queriers (i.e., to cache parts of the outsourced database).
Aggregated Signature Schemes
In this section, we take a closer look at the two signature schemes considered in [19] and illustrate their respective mutability properties.
Condensed-RSA
The RSA [20] signature scheme is multiplicatively homomorphic which makes it suitable for combining multiple signatures generated by a single signer into one condensed signature. 4 A valid condensed signature signifies to the verifier that each individual signature contained in the condensed signature is valid, i.e., generated by the purported signer. Aggregation of single-signer RSA signatures can be performed incrementally by anyone in possession of individual RSA signatures. By incrementally, we mean that the signatures can be combined in any order and the aggregation need not be carried out in a single operation. 
RSA
. Verifying a signature involves checking that
. Both signature generation and verification involve computing one modular exponentiation. 
Condensed-RSA Signature Scheme: Given
X different messages Y Ì b a © d c
BGLS
Boneh, et al. in [4] construct an interesting aggregated signature scheme that allows aggregation of signatures generated by multiple signers on different messages into one short signature based on elliptic curves and bilinear mappings. This scheme (BGLS) operates in a Gap Diffie-Hellman group (GDH) -a group where the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (DDH) is easy while the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDH) is hard. The first instance of such a group was illustrated in [16] . Prior to describing the BGLS signature scheme, we briefly overview the necessary parameters [4] . 
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Immutable Signature Schemes
In this section, we propose extensions that strengthen previously described signature schemes and make them immutable.
Immutable Condensed RSA (IC-RSA)
To make condensed-RSA signatures immutable, we use the technique that can be broadly classified as a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of signatures. The server, instead of revealing the actual aggregated signature for a posed query, reveals only the proof of knowledge of that signature. We present two variants: one that requires interaction, based on the well-known Guillou-Quisquater scheme, and the other that is non-interactive, based on so-called "signatures of knowledge".
Interactive Variant
This technique uses the well-known Guillou-Quisquater (GQ) identification scheme [12] which is among the most efficient follow-ons to the original Fiat-Shamir zero-knowledge identification Scheme [2] . The version we present is an interactive protocol between the server (Prover) and the querier (Verifier) that provides the latter with a zero-knowledge proof that the Prover has a valid Condensed-RSA signature corresponding to the records in the query result set. Basically, as shown in Figure 2 , the server returns to the querier the result set along with a witness. The querier then sends a random challenge to which the server replies with a valid response. The response together with the witness convince the querier of server's knowledge of the Condensed-RSA signature, without revealing any knowledge about the Condensed-RSA signature itself.
The actual protocol is shown, in more detail, in Figure 3 . We use the terms Prover (P) and Verifier (V) instead of Server and Querier, respectively, since the protocol is not specific to the ODB setting 6 
be the condensed-RSA signature computed as shown above. Recall that
is the public key of the original data-owner which all concerned parties are assumed to possess. Let and § is the RSA modulus of the data owner who generated the individual RSA signatures corresponding to the records in the result set 7 and , the corresponding public exponent. In step 2, the verifier (querier) sends back a challenge
Generate random challenge
If test verifies then accept, else reject Security Considerations: GQ is RSA-based; the protocol is known to be honest-verifier zero-knowledge and is secure against impersonation under passive attacks, assuming RSA is one-way [12] . Forgery: The public exponent defines the security level, i.e., a cheating prover can convince the verifier, and thus defeat the protocol with probability ¡ ! , by correctly guessing the value of the challenge G a priori. Therefore, the bit-length of G should be large enough. Note that the above protocol can be run multiple times for commensurably lower probability of successful forgery. In general, if it is run X times, the probability of forgery is h g f .
Security Assumptions:
The security of the protocol is based on the hardness of the RSA problem (i.e., computing -th roots mod a composite integer § which is formed as a product of two large primes.)
Non-Interactive Immutable Condensed-RSA
The second, non-interactive, variant uses the technique of Signatures of Knowledge first popularized by Camenisch and Stadler in [6] . Specifically, we use the so-called SKROOTLOG primitive which can be used to prove knowledge of an -th root of the discrete logarithm of a value to a given base. Before presenting the details, we briefly describe how this technique is used in our scenario. Conceptually, the server reveals all records matching the query as well as a signature of knowledge for the actual condensed-RSA signature corresponding to these records. A querier verifies by checking the SKROOTLOG proof. However, since the querier never actually gets the condensed signature, she can not exploit the mutability of Condensed-RSA to derive new signatures. In general, the querier can not derive proofs for any other queries by using proofs for any number of previously posed queries. 
SKROOTLOG Details: Let
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Below, we briefly outline an efficient version of SKROOTLOG proposed in [6] which is applicable when the public exponent is a small value (for instance, this efficient SKROOTLOG version is applicable when the value of is set to ). [6] needs to be used. The interactive protocol corresponding to the above definition of SKROOT-LOG is proven honest-verifier zero-knowledge in [5] . For brevity, we skip the details of this discussion and refer interested readers to [6] . However, we would like to note that the security of the SKROOTLOG protocol is based on the difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem and the RSA problem. In addition, SKREP is based on the security of Schnorr signature scheme. The Non-Interactive IC-RSA, which in essence is the SKROOTLOG primitive, is therefore honest-verifier zero-knowledge [5] . This implies that the querier who is given only the proof of the condensed RSA signature, can not derive new signatures. In addition, the querier can not derive new proofs for any other queries by using proofs for any number of previously posed queries.
Definition 1 If is small, it is possible to show the proof of knowledge of the -th root of the discrete log of
Discussion
In this section, we compare the two techniques presented above. . On the other hand, Interactive (GQ based) technique requires no additional parameter generation at the server since the server only requires to have knowledge of each data owner's RSA public key Verifiability: In the Non-Interactive technique, the SKROOTLOG proof provided by the server is universally verifiable (or in other words, the proof is self authenticating and hence transferrable). On the other hand, the Interactive (GQ-based) technique provides guarantees only to the interactive verifier who poses the challenge and the proof of knowledge in this case is non-transferrable. This is perhaps the biggest difference between the two techniques.
Communication Rounds: Since SKROOTLOG based technique requires no interaction with the verifier for the proof, it requires no additional rounds of communication. In other words, the server executes the query and returns the result set as well as the proof of knowledge of the corresponding unified Condensed-RSA signature. On the other hand, the Interactive technique requires two additional rounds of communication with the verifier.
Immutable BGLS
The extension to aggregated BGLS to achieve immutability is very simple: The server computes its own signature on the whole query reply and aggregates it with the aggregated BGLS signature of the owners. In other words, for a given query whose result includes messages I f B a will be unique for each record set returned as it consists exactly of the selected records, and moreover, it will be different than any Immutability Considerations: The immutability property of the above scheme relies upon the inability of an adversary to forge the server's signature. This, in turn, implies that such an adversary cannot use an aggregate BGLS signature to generate a new Immutable-BGLS signature that verifies. In other words, the Immutable-BGLS signature construction is resistant to mutations assuming that BGLS signatures are unforgeable.
Performance Analysis
In this section, we present and discuss the experimental results for immutable signature schemes. We mainly consider the overheads introduced by the extensions we made to the Condensed-RSA and BGLS signature schemes to achieve immutability. Since these signature schemes were not implemented in their entirety, we provide rough estimates on the running costs by showing the number of additional basic cryptographic operations (such as modular exponentiations and multiplications) required by the extensions and also point out any additional communication overheads. We then present the actual cost (time) required to carry out these additional operations. Table 1 enlists the computational as well as communication overheads associated with the various techniques we propose in this paper. We use the following notation to describe the various basic cryptographic operations: Table 2 gives the actual time required to generate a single signature and also the time required to verify a single signature, multiple signatures by a single signer, and multiple signatures by multiple signers in both condensed RSA and BGLS schemes. We set the RSA public exponent We also would like to mention at this point that SKROOTLOG, in addition to the above mentioned costs, also incurs additional setup costs. These costs are necessary to set the parameters prime and element £ of order § . Further, it is also worth noting that since condensed-RSA only enables single-signer aggregation, it is necessary for the server to set up multiple sets of parameters: one for each signer. 
Related Work
Database security has been studied extensively within the database as well as cryptographic research communities. Specifically, the problem of data privacy for outsourced databases has been investigated by many. Hacigümüş, et al. examined various challenges associated with providing database as a service in [15] . In our work, we used a very similar system model. Private Information Retrieval (PIR) [8, 10] deals with the exact matching problem and has been explored extensively in the cryptographic literature. PIR is primarily concerned with private retrieval of parts of data stored at an external server, such that no partial information about the query is leaked to the server. PIR techniques support searching based on either the physical location [8] of the data or using keywords [7] . However, most of current PIR techniques aim for very strong security bounds and, consequently, remain unsuitable for practical purposes. Concretely, PIR schemes typically require either multiple non-colluding servers or multiple rounds of communication.
Song et al. [21] develop a more pragmatic scheme to search on data encrypted using a secret symmetric key. Their scheme requires a single server and offers fairly low computational complexity. In summary, searching on encrypted data is becoming an increasingly popular research topic with such recent interesting results as [21, 11] . However, the aforementioned schemes only support exact-match queries, i.e., the server returns data matching either a given address or a given keyword. Hacigümüş, et al. in [13] explore how different types of SQL queries can be executed over encrypted data and provide detailed query processing and optimization techniques. Specifically, they support range searches and joins in addition to exact-match queries.
[14] investigated integrity issues in the ODB model: data encryption is used in combination with manipulation detection codes to provide integrity. As mentioned earlier [19] mainly focuses on the use of digital signatures in order to facilitate efficient integrity assessment. Specifically, [19] constructs a simple RSA-based aggregation technique based on fast batch verification [3] of RSA signatures. Another solution explored in [19] uses aggregated signatures proposed by Boneh, et al. [4] . This scheme is based on bilinear maps and provides an elegant mechanism to aggregate § individual signatures on § messages (by X ¡ § signers) into one single signature.
[9] explores the applicability of Merkle Hash Tree-s (MHT-s) as a technique for providing authenticity and integrity in third-party data publication settings. MHT-s are created by letting the tree leaf nodes represent the ordered set of records of a relation, sorted by a selected attribute. With the help of a MHT, a server can answer a client's query by returning the tree nodes necessary to prove the existence of the selected records. MHT-s are especially well suited for range queries due to the few nodes needing to be returned and the relatively cheap computations required by the client (1 modular exponentiation to verify the MHT's root signature and computation of hash values linear in the number of records returned). Furthermore, this solution provides query completeness for queries involving a single attribute in the predicate, namely proof that the server has included all applicable records in its query response. Merkle first introduced MHT-s in [18] and they were initially used for the purpose of one-time signatures and authenticated public key distribution. The use of authenticated data structures for providing data integrity in general has been studied extensively in [17] .
Conclusions
In this paper, we introduced the notion of immutability for aggregated signature schemes. Some aggregated signature schemes suitable for providing data integrity and origin authentication for outsourced databases were considered recently in [19] . In this paper, we extended this work to provide several practical mechanisms to achieve immutability for these schemes. We provided a detailed comparison and performance analysis of the proposed techniques.
